ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE, Requirements for Class MC and Metallic Liners of Class CC Components of Light-Water-Cooled Plants , provides requirements for preservice and inservice examination/inspection, repair/replacement activities, and testing of Class MC (metal containment) pressure-retaining components and their integral attachments and repair/replacement activities and testing of Class CC (concrete containment) pressure-retaining components and their integral attachments for Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) and Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). Similarly, Subsection IWL, Requirements for Class CC Concrete Components of Light-Water-Cooled Plants , provides requirements for preservice and inservice examination/inspection, repair/replacement activities, and testing of the reinforced concrete and post-tensioning systems of Class CC (concrete containment) components for BWRs and PWRs. Together with Subsection IWA, General Requirements , a comprehensive basis is provided for ensuring the continued structural and leak-tight integrity of containments in nuclear power plants.

In the designing, specifying, and constructing of a bioprocessing facility, there are an enormous number of factors that come into play. There are regulations that have to be followed, specific requirements for materials of construction that have to be adhered to, design nuances of piping systems and equipment that have to meet the all-important requirements for cleanability, and also the self-induced requirements that are put into place to make certain that all of this is accomplished in a well-orchestrated and documented fashion. The last line of defense in making certain that all of this comes together as specified is in the examination, inspection, and testing that takes place throughout the design, fabrication, and installation processes in the building of a bioprocessing facility.

A generic term for a device inserted into a pipeline and then freely traverses the line is a “pig.” Pigs come in many shapes, materials, colors, and functions. From a functional perspective, there are cleaning pigs, inspection pigs, and repair pigs. The focus of this chapter is on smart pigs that perform in-line inspections (ILI) surveys.

Direct assessment methodologies are only applicable for time dependent threats (i.e., internal corrosion, external corrosion, and stress corrosion cracking). Time-independent threats (i.e., operator error, weather related/outside force, and third party/excavation damage) and stable threats (i.e., equipment failure, manufacturing defects, and construction defects) do not have industry recognized direct assessment methodologies. Prudent operators should assess time-independent and stable threats by other means than direct assessment. Operator training audits, monitoring of third party activity, inspection of equipment, pressure testing, and In-Line Inspection (ILI) are options for assessing these threats.

The 1960s and 1970s was a good time for the nuclear industry. The building of nuclear power plants was at an all-time high in the United States with the majority of the current operating fleet coming on-line in the late 1960s and early 1970s. While these plants were being built, the need to maintain these plants in a safe operating condition was discussed. The practice of performing inspections for fossil-fueled power plants was well established and the risk of operating fossil-fueled plant was understood. Although the nature and extent of the inspection share, in a large measure, evolved from several decades of operating experiences of many power stations, no formalized codes for conducting these inspections had been developed in the United States. Rather, a variety of rules were being imposed by the enforcement authorities having jurisdiction at the power plant sites.

This chapter provides a summary of analysis and design and pre-operational inspection and testing requirements for concrete and steel containments. Both conventionally reinforced as well as prestressed concrete containments are included. Containments are intended to provide a leak-tight boundary against accident pressure loading which essentially dictates the generally used cylindrical shape. The size of the containment and available free volume depends upon equipment layout and operational requirements. The available free volume within the containment affects the magnitude of pressure that can be generated during an accident. In general, conventionally reinforced concrete and steel containments have been used for small containments with low to moderate internal design pressure. But large containments with relatively high internal design pressure require either a prestressed concrete or a steel containment. In general, selection of containment type (conventional concrete, prestressed concrete or steel) depends upon considerations for the equipment size and layout, design pressure and other loadings, construction cost and schedule.

Initial requirement defect identification and their mitigation is the key aspect in planning the development of the system. In this paper we are trying to identify potential requirement defect through Inspection Technique and setting defect severity as well their priority to mitigate. Here, we propose a Framework for Reliable Requirement Specification (RRS) consisting three major component 1) Input component in the form of Initial Requirement 2) Free Wheel Processing Assembly as the combination of Defect Identification Technique, Requirement Defect, Severity & priority and Defect Mitigation 3) Output component in the form of Reliable Requirement Specification. The importance of this research is to construct initial requirement defect free and also make it capable to deliver the concrete, high quality and reliable requirement for the further phases of the Software Development.

This Chapter provides commentary and practical examples on the materials, design, fabrication, installation, and examination requirements for Core Support Structures (CSS) in Section III, Division 1, Subsection NG of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel (ASME B&PV) Code [1]. In addition, commentary is provided on Section XI [2] of the Code, as the rules apply to CSS repair, replacement, examination, and inspection requirements. The 4th Edition of this Chapter has been updated to reflect the 2010 Edition of the ASME B&PV Code with 2011 Addenda, and includes commentary on the following topics: • Background on Subsection NG Development • Definition of Class CS and Jurisdictional Boundaries • Discussion of Typical Materials Used • Design By Analysis Rules and Allowable Limits • Owner's Design Specification and Design Reports • Fabrication, Installation, and Examination • Environmental Effects • Selected Interpretations and Code Cases Applicable to NG • Improvements and Future Developments in Subsection NG • Material Degradation Issues • Compatibility of Subsection NG with Other International Codes • Realistic Design Loads for Reactor Internals • Summary of Changes to 2010 Edition of the ASME Code for CSS

ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE, Requirements for Class MC and Metallic Liners of Class CC Components of Light-Water Cooled Plants , specifies requirements for preservice and inservice examination/inspection, repair/replacement activities, and testing of Class MC (metal containment) pressure-retaining components and their integral attachments and repair/replacement activities and testing of Class CC (concrete containment) pressure-retaining components and their integral attachments for Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) and Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). Similarly, Subsection IWL, Requirements for Class CC Concrete Components of Light-Water Cooled Plants , specifies requirements for preservice and inservice examination/inspection, repair/replacement activities, and testing of the reinforced concrete and the post-tensioning systems of Class CC (concrete containment) components for BWRs and PWRs. Together with Subsection IWA, General Requirements , a comprehensive basis is provided for ensuring the continued structural and leak-tight integrity of containments in nuclear power facilities. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC or NRC) incorporated the requirements of the 1992 Edition with the 1992 Addenda of Subsections IWA, IWE, and IWL into the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) in an amendment of Title 10, Part 50.55a (10 CFR 50.55a) [4] that was published in the Federal Register (FR) on August 8, 1996. This amendment, 61 FR 41303 [5], contained rules that provided requirements in addition to those in Subsections IWE and IWL, and also specified that certain provisions in these Subsections were optional and not required for regulatory compliance. The rulemaking also required that all nuclear power plants in the United States develop and implement a containment inspection program in accordance with Section XI, Subsections IWA, IWE, and IWL (as applicable for the type of containment) by September 9, 2001. On September 12, 1999, the USNRC amended this rulemaking in a subsequent rulemaking, 64 FR 51370 [6], to incorporate by reference the 1995 Edition with the 1996 Addenda of Subsections IWA, IWE, and IWL into 10 CFR 50.55a. The rule also allowed Owners to continue to use the 1992 Edition with the 1992 Addenda of these Subsections for the containment inspection program, if so desired. The effective date for this amendment was November 22, 1999. Again, this rulemaking included several requirements in addition to those of ASME Section XI, and is also required that the Owners of all nuclear power plants in the United States develop and implement a containment inspection program by September 9, 2001.

This research aims to develop System Requirement Specification of Student's Emotion Based System that will be implemented in INTI International University, Nilai, Malaysia. This paper focuses more on traceability techniques to capturing student's emotion as main input of Student's Emotion Based System. We believe this system will generate more accurate feedback to support interactive teaching learning environment in Higher Education Institution. System Requirement Engineering identifies the system capability to solve problem and to achieve its objectives. This paper reports two main activities which are Requirement Elicitation and Traceability Tools. Requirement Elicitation is the basis discussion with customer in term of system definition understood by the customer. The traceability tools enable inspection the traceability relationship to ensure that no verification relationships have been omitted and that no excess verification relationships are present. Both activities are involving three basics knowledge known as Design Knowledge, Implementation Knowledge and Domain Knowledge. We follow the four phases of Requirement Engineering to synchronize all the three knowledge. Those phases are Requirement Elicitation, Negotiation, Specification-Documentation and Validation-Verification. As a result, this paper reports the traceability tools as foundation of developing Student's Emotion Based System in INTI International University, Malaysia.

With the development of computer information technology and deepening of information system application in electric power enterprises, requirements for information security increase gradually. In order to ensure and supervise the security of information intranet of the State Grid Corporation of China, the company organized inspection teams to conduct inspection activities for information intranet. By analyzing the potential security threats of information intranet, and introduces how inspection teams fill leak, eliminate treats and protect the security of information intranet in aspects of technology and management.

The fundamental design concepts embodied in steam turbines and generators are fairly simple—allow high pressure steam to expand through a series of blades mounted to a rotating member to extract thermal energy from pressurized steam and convert it to mechanical energy in the form of torque. Then utilize this torque to rotate a large electromagnet past a series of conductors to produce current flow in the conductors—pretty simple. However, as simple as this seems, these are very complicated machines that involve essentially all aspects of engineering—statics and dynamics, heat transfer, fluid mechanics, thermodynamics, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, organic and inorganic chemistry, steam cycle chemistry, materials behavior (stress/strain), fracture mechanics, corrosion, erosion, electrical (power) engineering, electric circuits and circuit models, electromagnetics, control theory and controls, power system analysis, dielectrics and electrical insulation, tribology, and various forms of materials joining from glues and resins to soldering, brazing, and welding.

First of all, what exactly is the point of tank inspections? Granted, some leak or catch fire, and there are no doubt a small number of major failures, but the everyday world is not exactly full of catastrophic tank disasters. On the face of it, API codes are quite clear on the subject — their objective is to achieve tank integrity (it says so in API 653 section 1). Integrity must surely mean structural integrity, i.e. the avoidance of catastrophic failure or major collapse leading to total loss of the tank contents. All right. What about leaks? Clearly, leaks are undesirable and published codes have quite a bit to say about avoiding them. API 575 starts the ball rolling in its section 5: Reasons for inspection and causes of deterioration. It mentions the objective of avoiding holes in all areas of a tank, to avoid the risk of hazards from flammable leaks or environmental pollution. The situation elsewhere in the codes is not quite so straightforward — it is a long-standing principle of API codes that fairly deep isolated pits are unlikely to lead to structural failure. For tanks, this is balanced by API 653's approach to repairs; patch plates, flush insert repairs or hot taps are really no problem as far as API 653 is concerned, so leaks from isolated pitting can be repaired if or when they occur.

This chapter is about code recommendations on how to inspect a tank and how often you should do it. They are of course separate subjects and the two codes that address them, API 653 and API 575, approach them from slightly different viewpoints. API 653 divides inspections into different types and addresses inspection interval (or frequency) in its section 6. It also introduces the way in which a tank inspection interval can be based around a risk-based inspection (RBI) assessment. It seems to like this idea. The baton then passes across to API 575 section 7, which confirms the method of corrosion rate calculation and then launches into a detailed methodology of how to inspect the various parts of a tank inside and outside, when it is in or out of service. This API RP 575 section is a major source of exam questions (open and closed book) and, looking objectively, gives excellent experienced-based guidance on how to inspect tanks. We will look at these relevant sections of API 653 and API RP 575 in turn.

API inspection codes in general have a strange love—hate relationship with hydrotesting. Storage tanks are no exception — on one hand API 653 explains how and when it should be done, but this is followed up by a long list of valid scenarios for exemption. Unlike pressure equipment items, the underlying message is that (excluding new or fully reconstructed tanks) a hydrotest on a storage tank is something that you choose to do, rather then being forced to do so by API 653.

What is third party inspection and why is it mandatory for Section I construction? In the simplest terms, third party inspection refers to the system evolved by the Code committee to assure that code rules are actually followed. That is a basic truth, but it does not fully answer the question regarding why it is mandatory. It is not mandatory for other code constructions such as that governed by ASME B31.1, so why is it so for Section I construction? The answer is twofold; (1) to assure consistent, uniform application of code rules thus assuring a certain degree of safe equipment as well as easing interstate and international trade and (2) to protect the use of the ASME marks (e.g., Code symbol stamps). In the early days of the ASME boiler code, it was not uncommon for each state or jurisdiction to have its own boiler inspection requirements. Because there were no uniform requirements between the states for stamping of boilers, or uniform system for qualifying inspectors and applying Code rules, a boiler manufacturer in one state often had to have its boiler inspected and accepted by the inspector from the state in which the boiler was to be installed. This was a big burden to commerce in general and the boiler manufacturers in particular. It could be argued that this also impacted safety of the equipment due to the differing degrees of expertise of the inspectors regarding understanding and application of Code rules. These conditions led to the formation of the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (National Board) which, with the support of the American Boiler Manufacturers Association (ABMA) and the Uniform Boiler and Pressure Vessels Laws Society, brought about a system for uniform examination of inspectors, consistent application of Code rules and uniform rules for stamping of boilers (i.e., the use of the ASME Code symbol, or mark). This greatly eased the manufacturers' burden of obtaining multiple inspections and stampings and thus making interstate commerce much more efficient. It also added to the general welfare by assuring the public of the uniform application of Code rules.

In order for the Code to be effective, there must be some means of assuring that it has been followed. Each phase of the work of designing, manufacturing, and assembling the boiler or component to which the ASME Code symbol is applied must be done in accordance with the Code (see Chapter 8, Third Party Inspection, regarding CSP-53, Protection of The ASME Mark). Assurance that a boiler is constructed to the Code is provided, in part, by a process called Code certification. In the simplest case of a complete boiler unit made by a single manufacturer, the manufacturer must certify on a form called a Manufacturer's Data Report Form that all work done by the manufacturer or others responsible to the manufacturer complies with all requirements of the Code. When some portion is performed by others not responsible to the manufacturer, the manufacturer must obtain the other organization's Code certification. In addition, the manufacturer must stamp the boiler with a Code symbol, which signifies that it has been constructed in accordance with the Code. Certification thus is an integral part of a quality assurance program which establishes that: 1. The organization that did the work held an appropriate ASME Certificate of Authorization to use a Code symbol; 2. The organization has certified compliance with the Code rules by signing and furnishing the appropriate Manufacturer's Data Report Form; 3. The organization has applied the Code symbol stamp to identify the work covered by its Data Report Form; 4. An Authorized Inspector or Certified Individual has confirmed by signing the Data Report Form that, to the best of his or her knowledge, the work complied with the applicable Code rules.

After a detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the traditional firewall, this article offers a new technology: stateful inspection packet filter firewall, and with concrete examples of its practical application in the B2B transaction mode to prove that state inspection packet filter can defend the vast number of security attacks, in a sense, it can be considered absolutely secure system.

Quality inspection is an important aspect of modern industrial manufacturing. In automotive industry, automatic paint inspection is of crucial importance to maintain the paint quality. In most worldwide automotive industries, the inspection process is still mainly performed by human vision, and thus, is insufficient and costly. Therefore, automatic paint defect inspection is required to reduce the cost and time waste caused by defects. In this paper a new approach is proposed for detection of defects on painted car body through serial paint images and subsequent classifying of the localized defect types. Initially, defects are detected and localized by using a rotation invariant measure of the local variance (VAR) operator and next, then classified by using learning vector quantization (LVQ) neural network.