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International Conference on Instrumentation, Measurement, Circuits and Systems (ICIMCS 2011)
Chen Ming
Chen Ming
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In the process of seeking for game-theoretic solutions, players are supposed to be rational which means that they all tend to maximize their expected payoffs. However, there is no a definitely definition of rationality in game theory. Usual assumption of mutual knowledge of individual rationality to be common knowledge is coarse and maybe too strong, especially when the game is finite. The nested degree of interactive knowledge of individual rationality, in fact, is a fixed number which we will give out in this paper. In addition we modify two game-theoretic solution algorithms for the need of computer programming and formalize the special rationality conditions for each solution algorithm that we modified. On the other hand, we propose a feasible algorithm-solution which in correspondence with strong rationality. Moreover, we will show that iterated announcement of the rationality we defined could arrive exactly at the algorithm-solution, correspondingly.

Public Announcement Logic
Epistemic Game Models and Procedures
Rationality and Iterated Announcement of Rationality
Discussion and Conclusion
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