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ASME Press Select Proceedings

International Conference on Electronics, Information and Communication Engineering (EICE 2012)

By
Garry Lee
Garry Lee
Information Engineering Research Institute
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ISBN:
9780791859971
No. of Pages:
1008
Publisher:
ASME Press
Publication date:
2012

Based on the efficient co-op advertising between a manufacturer and a retailer, Rubinstein Bargaining Model is applied to discuss distribution of the joint profit in supply chain between the manufacturer and the retailer in consideration of the influence of bargaining capability by discount rate and breakdown risk. And the paper also presents how discount rate and breakdown risk affect the final distribution of the joint profit in supply chain between the manufacturer and the retailer. In view of the manufacturer, its power of bargaining reduces with increase of its discount rate or breakdown risk, while increases with the retailer' discount rate or breakdown risk increasing.

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