The Shield Tank and End Shield Cooling System in the CANDU reactor contains a large volume of light water surrounding the Calandria and circulates water to remove heat that arises from the reactor core and Moderator. In a beyond design basis event that results in a severe event, progression in the absence of mitigating cooling actions could result in a large heat load being transferred to the water inside the shield tank from the calandria wall causing shield tank failure due to over pressurization. Following the 2011 events at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the adequacy of system pressure relief was assessed against severe events. Emergency mitigating equipment tie-ins for water make-up will likely limit the core damage state and prevent the need to protect the shield tank. However, Shield Tank Overpressure Protection (STOP) has been installed against severe event conditions pursuant to the CANDU defense-in-depth safety philosophy. A larger open vent line has been installed at some CANDU units on the top of the shield tank outside containment. This design routes the vent piping high enough to preclude any venting under any operational configuration and discharges back into the containment through an existing spare penetration. Vent piping is designed as Nuclear Class 2 in accordance with ASME BPVC Section III. Assessment of stresses in the modification piping was also completed for BDBEs including for a lower probability seismic event, steam venting and corresponding higher pressure and temperature conditions.