Existing corrosion assessment models were developed and validated under the assumption that internal pressure was the principal driver for burst failure and that longitudinal strain levels were low. The impact of moderate to high levels of longitudinal strain on burst capacity had not been explicitly considered. This paper summarizes work performed as part of a major effort funded by the US Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (DOT PHMSA) aimed at examining the impact of longitudinal strain on the integrity of pipelines with corrosion anomalies. This paper focuses on the burst pressure of corroded pipes under high longitudinal strains. It is known that longitudinal tensile strain does not reduce the burst pressure relative to that of pipes subjected to low longitudinal strains. Therefore, existing burst pressure models can be considered adequate when the longitudinal strain is tensile. However, longitudinal compressive strain was found to lead to a moderate reduction in burst pressure. Numerical analyses were conducted to study the effect of longitudinal compressive strain on the burst pressure of corroded pipes. A burst pressure reduction formula was developed as a function of the longitudinal compressive strain. Full-scale tests were conducted to confirm the findings of the numerical analysis. Guidelines for assessing the burst pressure of corroded pipes under high longitudinal compressive strains were developed from the outcome of numerical analysis and experimental tests. The guidelines are applicable to different types of corrosion anomalies, including circumferential grooves, longitudinal grooves and general corrosion.

The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 1 on April 8, 2016 that is expected to have an impact on the pipeline industry’s approach to crack growth analyses. Specifically, the NPRM defines values for pipe toughness that should be used in analyzing crack anomalies that are subjected to fatigue growth for instances in which known or measured pipe toughness values are not available. Pipeline Operators conduct these types of analyses to derive remaining life values which can in turn be utilized to establish pipeline integrity reassessment intervals. Thus, the impacts of this NPRM are felt by all pipeline operators who own assets in which cracking is considered a threat. The goal of this paper is to quantify the effects of using the NPRM defined toughness values in pressure test assessments for scenarios where pipe toughness values are unavailable.

Since the publication of API Recommended Practice (RP) 1173: Pipeline Safety Management Systems, in July 2015, the energy pipeline trade groups in North America (API, AOPL, AGA, INGAA, APGA and CEPA) have worked collaboratively to develop tools and programs to assist energy pipeline operators with the development and implementation of appropriate programs and processes. These resources include a Planning Tool, Implementation Tool and Evaluation Tool, as well as a Maturity Model that describes a continuum of implementation levels. The Planning Tool is used to compare an operator’s existing management system to the RP requirements and develop action plans and assign responsibilities to close gaps. It is intended to help operators achieve Level 1 maturity (develop a plan and begin work). The Implementation Tool is used to evaluate and summarize implementation status by question, element and overall, and helps track development of program implementation to Level 3 maturity. The Evaluation Tool plays two key roles addressing the conformity and effectiveness of the system. This tool is used to assess and report the level of conformity to the requirements, the “shall” statements, of the RP and possible Level 4 maturity. The Evaluation Tool also provides the means to appraise the effectiveness of an operator’s programs in achieving the objectives of the RP, asking the key question, “Is the system helping and driving improvement?” These resources can be supplemented by the voluntary third-party audit program developed by API and the Peer-to-Peer sharing process.

This paper presents the development and testing of an Electro-Magnetic Acoustic Transducer (EMAT) sensor prototype to detect and quantify longitudinal cracks in small diameter and difficult to inspect or unpiggable gas pipelines. The development of the system was a collaborative and jointly-funded work between Quest Integrated, Gas Technology Institute, Operations Technology Development, and US DOT, Pipeline Hazardous Material Safety Admin (PHMSA). The initial focus for the project was to inspect 8-inch (200 mm) diameter pipes with robotic or tethered towing, with the eventual goal of a free-swimming tool. A bench scale lab prototype has been successfully completed and tested in Phase 1 of the project in 2016. The prototype demonstrated the basic approach of a EMAT tool for crack detection and sizing that could be packaged into a single module, had reasonable flaw depth sensitivity, was bidirectional, and could negotiate a 1.5 D bend. Phase 2 focused on identifying and solving additional implementation issues, developing a more hardened tool for field pull testing, improving flaw sizing, and the necessary internal electronics and processing algorithms. The prototype recently developed in Phase 2 was tested in an extended length of 8-inch diameter steel pipe with pre-set and controlled longitudinal cracks. The results demonstrated the applicability of the integrated prototype in locating and sizing multiple flaws in the axial direction. This paper discusses the EMAT sensor development and results of the laboratory testing program.

At the forefront of the effort to understand and mitigate pipeline corrosion is the prediction of corrosion growth rates. It is important to understand the effect of corrosion growth estimates on integrity management decisions. An overly conservative approach results in unnecessary digs, while removing conservatism increases the potential for a missed feature to grow to a threatening size. While approaches to feature depth growth have been well-established, there has been less investigation into the growth of feature lengths. A literature review was performed on the methodologies applicable to length growth, and their performance was compared to those that only account for depth growth using a sample analysis. For pipelines with multiple in-line inspection (ILI) runs, feature or signal matching can be used to estimate the change in feature size. These rates can be used directly on individual features, averaged across pipe joints, or compiled into a statistical distribution. Alternatively, only one ILI measurement can be used and an assumption made on the age of the defect. These approaches are more commonly applied to depth growth but could be used to predict length growth as well. To compare the growth methodologies, the study used historical ILI measurements of a liquid pipeline to predict feature sizes and estimated burst pressures determined at the time of the latest ILI. The number of defects correctly predicted to have an insufficient burst pressure safety factor for safe operation was compared to the number of defects that were erroneously predicted to not meet this criterion, and those that were predicted to be safe but later found to not meet the safety factor requirement. The number of erroneously flagged defects was found to vary the most between methodologies. For the assessed data set, using the joint average rate based on feature box-matching was non-conservative on average. It was also found that incorporating length growth did not significantly affect the accuracy of the burst pressure predictions.

The application of reliability-based structural integrity enables the process of quantitative risk assessment as part of pipelines’ integrity management program (IMP). This paper explores two topics that present challenges in terms of the practical adoption of a reliability-based IMP. The first challenge is the balance between perceived and true risk when implementing a quantitative reliability-based integrity model. This is a cornerstone for building stakeholder confidence in the calculated probability of failure ( PoF ) which is applied to safety and economically driven integrity decisions. The second challenge is the assurance that all relevant sources of uncertainty have been incorporated, which is essential for ensuring an accurate representation of the risk of failure of the pipeline. The level of conservatism (i.e. sufficient margin of error to maintain safety) incorporated when addressing these challenges may create a situation where calculated PoF s become inflated; becoming disproportionate to the failure history and contradictory to the current safe operation of pipelines being modeled. Two different PoF calibration approaches are proposed as practical options to address these challenges. The first method calibrates model error using an operator’s in-service failure history (i.e. failures that occurred under normal operation). The second method uses a set of failure data (including hydrostatic test failures and in-service failures) as selected by the operator considering key factors to ensure adequate representation of their specific pipeline system. These options will be demonstrated by assessing the integrity reliability of a hypothetical pipeline system. This work is expected to help evaluate the feasibility of challenging current practices regarding practical inclusion of epistemic uncertainty in integrity reliability analysis of pipelines.

This paper describes a novel technique for the detection of cracks in pipelines. The proposed in-line inspection technique has the ability to detect crack features at random angles in the pipeline, such as axial, circumferential, and any angle in between. This ability is novel to the current ILI technology offering and will also add value by detecting cracks in deformed pipes (i.e. in dents), and cracks associated with the girth weld (mid weld cracks, rapid cooling cracks and cracks parallel to the weld). Furthermore, the technology is suitable for detection of cracks in spiral welded pipes, both parallel to the spiral weld as well as perpendicular to the weld. Integrity issues around most features described above are not addressed with ILI tools, often forcing operators to perform hydrostatic tests to ensure pipeline safety. The technology described here is based on the use of wideband ultrasound inline inspection tools that are already in operation. They are designed for the inspection of structures operating in challenging environments such as offshore pipelines. Adjustments to the front-end analog system and data collection from a grid of transducers allow the tools to detect cracks in any orientation in the line. Description of changes to the test set-up are presented as well as the theoretical background behind crack detection. Historical development of the technology will be presented, such as early laboratory testing and proof of concept. The proof of concept data will be compared to the theoretical predictions. A detailed set of results are presented. These are from tests that were performed on samples sourced from North America and Europe which contain SCC features. Results from ongoing testing will be presented, which involved large-scale testing on SCC features in gas-filled pipe spools.

Safety culture is not a new concept, with origins dating back to 1986 and the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. [1] The recognition of safety culture in organizations and its influence on incidents has been growing, with gaps in safety culture having been cited as a major contributory factor to recent failures in the oil and gas industry including the Piper Alpha event nearly a quarter of a century ago and was most recently identified as a causal factor in the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster. [2] Many different approaches have been developed to measure and assess organizational attitudes and behaviours, with the goal of improving safety culture. Traditional approaches for measurement have focused on: ▪ Questionnaires or surveys. ▪ Interviews. ▪ Observations. ▪ Focus groups. ▪ Document analysis. While these approaches have provided valuable information regarding safety culture, more progressive approaches are being considered by leading companies. The establishment of Safety Culture Indicators and Continuous Monitoring as a method for improving safety culture is becoming more prevalent. This new approach enables companies to leverage the management systems that already are in place for managing their increasingly complex operating environments. Regulators have recognized this too and are beginning to recommend that continuous monitoring be included in a company’s toolbox as an additional approach to assessing internal safety culture. This paper describes a comprehensive safety culture maturity model created to provide organizations with a method to review their management system and assess their existing safety culture. The assessment aids the development of a suite of organization-specific indicators to facilitate application of a continuous monitoring approach for ongoing improvement of safety culture.

Current pipeline regulations in North America have changed significantly over the past several decades and will continue to change as public and regulatory scrutiny intensifies and new industry standards are developed (i.e. API RP 1173). As regulators assess the approach to take, they are increasingly looking at what other regulators are doing in their respective jurisdictions, including those at federal, state and provincial levels. Despite historical commitments to conceptual models fostering cooperation between regulators and regulated entities, recent trends in the United States signify a departure from performance or outcome-based regulation toward a more prescriptive approach. Pipelines remain the safest method of transporting oil and natural gas. 1 However, when pipeline incidents do occur, the consequences can be catastrophic and are often well publicized. Federal and state regulators are under increased pressure in the aftermath of high-profile incidents to assuage the concerns of legislators and the public at large. This paper generally compares various regulatory models and the relative benefits and drawbacks of each. A more in-depth review of regulatory changes in the United States is examined, to analyze the potential intended and unintended consequences of the move towards more prescriptive pipeline safety regulations.

To improve the safety of a pipeline system, engineers use different methods to diagnose the hazardous pipeline accidents. However, most methods ignore the time dependence of pipeline failures. The aim of this paper is to provide a novel approach to analyzing the hazardous liquid pipeline incidents’ temporal structure. The database of hazardous liquid spillages from the US between 2002 and 2018 is collected by the Pipeline Hazardous Material Safety Administration of the US Department of Transportation. The result suggests that the whole oil pipeline incident sequence cannot be modeled as a Poisson (random and independent) process, which means that a hazardous liquid pipeline incident is not statistically independent from the time elapsed since the previous event. But the serious pipeline failures are random and unpredictable. The analysis also indicates that the equipment failure, corrosion, material failure and incorrect operation are the four leading failure causes, responsible for most of the total incidents. The study provides insights into the current state of hazard liquid pipelines in the US and baseline failure statistics for the quantitative risk assessments of such pipelines.

CEPA Integrity First ® (Integrity First), led by the Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA) and a condition of membership, acts as a foundation for continual improvement, bringing our members together to share and implement leading practices in the areas of safety, environment and socio-economics. Integrity First includes three principles and ten priority areas (such as emergency management, pipeline integrity and water protection) where members collaborate, share leading practices and hold each other accountable. Integrity First is a management systems approach designed by CEPA members for industry to achieve collaborative continual improvement. It supports the collective setting of priorities, plans, assessments and improvements. While spreadsheets enabled the first rounds of assessments, CEPA required a solution that engaged multiple stakeholders over a complex timeline, coordinated activities clearly and precisely, while keeping the process transparent and efficient. The information generated is sensitive, so it must be kept secure while still being available for aggregation, reporting and reference. It needed to house communication tools so members could easily pull information and lastly, it needed to be easy to use. In August of 2015, CEPA established a partnership with SPAN Consulting (SPAN) to address these challenges through its software as a service (SaaS) offering called Octane™. This paper will review how CEPA designed and implemented a technical, web-based solution to enable an efficient, effective and transparent Integrity First with transformative impact. Specifically, through the use of this technology, there are now stronger communities of practice across industry with increased focus and effort on the opportunities to improve through real-time self-serve access to industry’s overall benchmarked performance, leadership and leading practices. CEPA’s commitment to enabling Integrity First is resulting in better adoption and improved performance.

Gas pipelines and networks are subject to multiple regulatory governance arrangements. One regime is economic regulation which is designed to ensure fair access to gas markets and emulate the price pressures of competition in a sector dominated by a few companies. Another regime is technical regulation which is designed to ensure pipeline system integrity is sufficient for the purposes of public safety, environmental protection and physical security of supply. As was highlighted in analysis of the San Bruno pipeline failure, these two regulatory regimes have substantially different orientations towards expenditure on things such as maintenance and inspection which ultimately impact public safety. Drawing on more than 50 interviews, document review and case studies of specific price determinations, we have investigated the extent to which these two regulatory regimes as enacted in Australia may conflict, and particularly whether economic regulation influences long-term public safety outcomes. We also draw on a comparison with how similar regulatory requirements are enacted in the United Kingdom (UK). Analysis shows that the overall orientation towards risk varies between the two regimes. The technical regulatory regime is a typical goal-setting style of risk governance with an overarching requirement that ‘reasonably practicable’ measures are put in place to minimize risk to the public. In contrast, the incentive-based economic regulatory regime requires that expenditure should be ‘efficient’ to warrant inclusion in the determination of acceptable charges to customers. How safety is considered within this remains an open question. Best practice in performance-based safety regimes such as those used in the UK and Australia require that regulators adopt an attitude towards companies based on the principle of ‘trust but verify’ as, generally speaking, all parties aim for the common goal of no accidents. Equally, in jurisdictions that favor prescriptive safety requirements such as the United States (US) the common goal remains. In contrast, stakeholders in the economic regulatory regime have significantly diverse interests; companies seek to maximize their individual financial returns and regulators seek to exert downward price pressures. We argue that these differences in the two regulatory regimes are significant for the management of public safety risk and conclude that minimizing risk to the public from a major pipeline failure would be better served by the economic regulatory regime’s separate consideration of safety-related from other expenditure and informed by the technical regulator’s view of safety.

Horizontal directional drilling (HDD) has become the preferred method for trenchless pipeline installations. Drilling pressures must be limited and a “no-drill zone” determined to avoid exceeding the strength of surrounding soil and rock. The currently accepted industry method of calculating hydraulic fracturing limiting pressure with application of an arbitrary safety factor contains several assumptions that are often not applicable to specific ground conditions. There is also no standard procedure for safety factor determination, resulting in detrimental impacts on drilling operations. This paper provides an analysis of the standard methods and proposes two alternative analytical models to more accurately determine the hydraulic fracture point and acceptable drilling pressure. These alternative methods provide greater understanding of the interaction between the drilling pressures and the surrounding ground strength properties. This allows for more accurate determination of horizontal directional drilling limitations. A comparison is presented to determine the differences in characteristics and assumptions for each model. The impact of specific soil properties and factors is investigated by means of a sensitivity analysis to determine the most critical soil information for each model.

Saudi Aramco gas pipeline location classification are designed with a similar approach to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) B31.8, which segments the pipeline length and counts the population for each segment. For the segments width, ASME utilizes a fixed distance, i.e., 400 m, while Saudi Aramco uses the pipeline Rupture Exposure Radius (RER), a consequence modeling driven distance similar to ASME’s Potential Impact Radius (PIR). The design factors (i.e., wall thickness requirements) are selected based on the population density within the defined segments, while also affecting the number of segments and emergency isolation valves required along the pipeline. Previously, Saudi Aramco pipelines safety standards set two default RER values to be used in the pipeline design based on conservative estimates. Based on the pipeline diameter, the RER is set at 1,000m or 2,000m for less than 24″ pipeline and greater than or equal to 24″ in size, respectively. Saudi Aramco standard defined RER by modelling the downwind dispersion distance at ground level in case of a pipeline full bore rupture to the limit of ½ the lower flammable limit (LFL) of the released vapor cloud, which was shown to be smaller than the standardized values. As sweet gas pipeline systems are hugely expanding to accommodate the increase in domestic demand in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, an efficient method for calculating RER was developed and introduced to the standard. For future pipelines, lower RER distances resulted in more flexibility in route selection, lower pipeline location class, and hence thinner wall thicknesses, less emergency isolation valves required, and longer span between sectionalizing valves, which all translate to cost savings. Existing pipelines currently require less upgrades when encountering urban development in their route, have less number of High Consequence Areas (HCAs) and better repair prioritization. By statistically analyzing and modeling the Saudi Aramco gas pipeline network, this paper discusses the development of an empirical formula that is representative and less conservative for estimating pipelines flammable gas cloud dispersion ½ LFL. The resulted calculation method had been developed utilizing consequence modeling software, and is expressed as a simple formula as a function of the pipeline pressure and diameter. The established method is currently adopted by Saudi Aramco pipeline safety standards, and resulted in a reduction of 74% of the average pipelines RER, with a standard deviation of 4 meters from the consequence modeling results, and minor diversion in consequence distances when compared to international standards calculation methods such as ASME PIR.

There are few standards or regulations to help stakeholders consider land use and development in the vicinity of existing pipeline systems. Land use planning that considers the existence of pipeline systems can support the planning for and provision of emergency services and pipeline integrity. This approach can also promote public safety and awareness through consistent and collaborative stakeholder engagement early in the land use planning process. In 2016, a CSA workshop was held with a variety of stakeholders impacted by land use planning around pipeline systems. The workshop identified that there was a need for consistency across the jurisdictions in the form of a national standard. The main goal of the new CSA Z663 standard is to provide guidance and best practices for land use planning and development. It also addresses roles, responsibilities and engagement of all stakeholders to help establish a consistent approach to land use planning. A review of CSA Z663 will illustrate how this document provides information, guidance and tools that are inclusive to all stakeholders. This paper will also highlight the history and key drivers behind the new CSA Z663 standard and provide an overview of the current scope and content. Finally, the paper will describe future considerations and additions to the standard.

In Australia (and the UK), pipeline operating companies have a regulatory obligation to ensure that their assets are designed, constructed, operated and maintained so that risk to people and the environment is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). In many routine cases, demonstration that risk is ALARP is a matter of compliance with relevant technical standards. There are some cases, however, that are more complex. If a pipeline has been subject to significant urban encroachment and does not conform to current design standards for this service, how does a pipeline operator decide whether risk controls are sufficient? In Australia, rather than either ‘grandfathering’ requirements or mandating retrospective compliance with new standards, operators are required to ensure pipelines are safe and that risk levels are acceptable. The answer in cases such as this is a matter of judgment and we have legal, moral and reputational responsibilities to get decisions such as this right. There is currently no formal requirement in the US for pipeline risks to be ALARP, although the concept is gradually being introduced to US industry safety law. Examples include US offshore well control rules, California refinery safety regulations and the nuclear sector concept of ‘as low as reasonably achievable’. In this paper, we demonstrate application of the ALARP process to a case study pipeline built in the 1960s that has been heavily encroached by urban development. The Australian risk-based approach required formal ALARP assessment including consideration of options to reduce pressure, relocate or replace the pipeline, or increase the level of physical or procedural protection. Current and predicted operating conditions on this existing pipeline allowed reduction in operating pressure in some of the encroached segments, sufficient to achieve the equivalent of current Australian requirements for ‘No Rupture’ in high consequence areas for new pipelines. In other areas this was not achievable and a lesser degree of pressure reduction was instigated, in combination with physical barrier protection. The physical barrier slabbing comprised over 7 km of 20 mm thick high-density polyethylene (HDPE) slabs, buried above the pipeline. This approach was new in Australia and required field trials to confirm effectiveness against tiger tooth excavators and rotary augers. These upgrades to the case study pipeline have significantly decreased the risk of pipeline failure, by reducing both likelihood and consequences of accidental impact. In combination with rigorous procedural controls such as patrol surveillance and community liaison, real risk reduction has been achieved and ALARP has been demonstrated.

We have all dealt with performance metrics in the pipeline industry. How do we measure operational excellence? Are we prioritizing the right corrective actions? Are our existing metrics fair and driving the right behaviors? Will they recognize success and actually show us and our clients that we are improving? This paper describes how Enbridge Major Projects measures and knows our Quality is improving; how we prioritize, focus, and monitor Quality improvement. Using our roadmap, your organization can transform existing data streams from anecdotal to well established facts that produce actionable results and drive business objectives. To reach this outcome, Enbridge Major Projects quickly matured our Quality Culture by leveraging our strong Safety Culture and habits. On our journey to meaningful overall Quality metrics, Enbridge built a foundation through non-punitive incident reporting using incident resolution tools and a Cost of Quality model. Cost of Quality models can be designed and executed in a variety of ways. This paper will focus on applying a model specifically suited for pipeline construction and operational activities. Key topics to be addressed include: • basic common principles of an overall Cost of Quality model, • various data collection methods to suit the model’s design, and • how a Documented Defects Quality cost model allows Enbridge to identify, prioritize, and monitor Quality improvements focused on preventing recurrence and occurrence of Quality issues. Examples will be provided for common pipeline applications, including valves, pipe, and other commodities and services. This approach has enabled Enbridge Major Projects to prioritize improvement actions and meet business objectives. Applying a Cost of Quality model will enhance your operational excellence and greater adoption would provide the foundation for industry-wide Quality performance metrics that will recognize success and validate that Quality is improving in the pipeline industry.

In South America, there is not a unique standard that regulates the Design, Operation, Maintenance and Integrity Management of Pipelines. Most of the countries had developed their own regulations and standards based mainly on the ASME Standards. These standards (like ASME B31.8 and ASME B31.8S) are being developed and updated considering the experience of different operators, but the results not always consider the difficulties in terms of social and cultural aspects of construct and operate pipelines in South America. Expansion of existing residential and commercial areas, or the construction of new developments near these pipelines can change a Location Class 1 into a Class 2 or Class 3 location. This development is not always predictable, besides the efforts of the South American Pipelines Operators made to coordinate this expansions with the local authorities, the growth in these countries are not well planned and the Operators are forced to face the situation without anticipation and without a backup of the regulations. Then the operators are unexpectedly left with a pipeline that no longer meets the requirements of its design code. ASME B31.8 establishes alternatives to adequate this changes into the design code: reducing the maximum allowable operating pressure of a pipeline, pipeline replacement increasing the wall thickness or by re-routing it away from the population. Those alternatives have high costs and significant operational difficulties, especially when the social conditions are not favorable. Additionally, some of these options do not even effectively solve the problem. Lowering operating stress levels do not always address the higher risk levels or safety concerns caused by the change in class. Increasing wall thickness, can lower probability of failure for a pipeline but not for all the combinations of threats, which depend on site specific conditions. The Pipeline Integrity Management System shall address all the threats as it is specified in ASME B31.8S, ensuring human safety as its primary objective. Third Party Damage is an important threat which in most of the pipelines around the world has caused the larger number of incidents. To manage this threat, risk assessments have been employed successfully to determine risk based on land use zones, proximity to utilities, alignment markers, one call and dig notification, surveillance intervals, among other variables. Calculating the risk to a specific pipeline near to a population after the mitigation activities are implemented, it may be shown that this pipeline has no more risk than other pipelines operating entirely in accordance with the design codes. Risks must be maintained “as low as reasonably practicable”, using cost benefit analysis to achieve these criteria. The reduction of the risk is accomplished by implementing additional mitigation plans, allowing to effectively use maintenance resources in areas where they will have the highest impact on risk. This paper shows how risk and engineering assessments and their consequent mitigation plans may be used to justify the safe operation of a pipeline without changing its original operating pressure following a change of class designation, exemplified with a case study from South America.

Integrity Management Program (IMP) is a systematic and documented program for assuring asset integrity throughout the full life cycle of an asset. To ensure safe and reliable operation, the British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission (Commission) has been requiring its licensed pipeline operators through its regulations to develop and implement pipeline integrity management programs (IMPs) in accordance with Canadian Industry Standard CSA Z662. The auditing process, the collated results and findings from the IMP audit years (2011–15) were published in IPC 2016-64161[1]. Since 2016, the Commission has enhanced its IMP compliance assurance process, and aligned it with the management system approach using Deming’s model of plan-do-check-act (PDCA) for IMP components and incorporated a lifecycle approach that spans the entire lifecycle of a pipeline system from planning to abandonment. In addition, the Commission has adopted a multi-criteria decision-making approach when prioritizing which operators to audit. This method utilizes weighted rank approach and takes into account multiple factors, such as, previous IMP audit results, pipeline length and product, class location, incident frequency, and asset age. Through collaborative efforts with the University of British Columbia (Okanagan), an innovative risk based audit tool — Integrity Management Program Audit and Knowledge Tool (IMPAKT) has been developed to help evaluate the compliance of operators’ IMP in terms of the management system approach and its associated risk. This tool conducts three-dimensional analysis of IMP performance using the failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) technique and allows the Commission to generate a risk profile for each IMP component to determine which components are most critical, requiring immediate attention. The final audit results are presented as a Risk Priority Number (RPN), which is a product of severity, occurrence and action. An effective integrity management program requires a strong safety culture, therefore, safety culture aspects are incorporated into the risk based auditing tool, IMPAKT. This risk based evaluation process also allows the Commission to develop a compliance benchmark to make comparison between different operators’ IMP results for continuous performance improvement. This paper presents the innovative approach developed and implemented by the Commission for the IMP compliance oversight (auditing) process and implication of such changes.

CSA Z662, Oil and gas pipeline systems, defines class location as “a geographical area classified according to its approximate population density and other characteristics that are considered when designing and pressure testing piping to be located in the area.” In other words, the purpose of class location designations is to identify areas where specific measures are considered necessary to enhance public safety. Designations range from Class 1 (rural) to Class 4 (urban with high-rise buildings). The current class location framework relies mainly on a location factor (L) to represent reliability. Higher reliability is achieved by using more resistant pipe — that is thicker and/or stronger — to reduce the probability of failure from operational hazards, such as corrosion and mechanical damage caused by line strikes. Currently, the need for a particular level of reliability is driven principally by the number of people impacted. This paper discusses possible measures that can be implemented in the next edition of Z662 that, beyond requiring thicker pipe for certain products, will strengthen the class location designation system by considering the potential impact radius of an ignited gas pipeline rupture, as well as the occupancy and nature of buildings within assessment areas. The paper also discusses possible changes to improve environmental protection by introducing the concept of a designated geographical area (DGA) and associated requirements, enhancements to valve spacing requirements, and the handling of changes to class location designations for existing pipelines through interim measures and retroactivity.