The Tohoku Region Pacific Coast Earthquake with magnitude 9.0 occurred at 2:46 PM of March 11th, 2011, followed by a huge Tsunami. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station suffered serious damages from the Tsunami, involving core melt and release of large amount of fission products to an environment. The station blackout (SBO) occurred due to submergence of emergency equipment by the sea water. The isolation condenser (IC) was the only device for decay heat removal at the unit-1 of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station after the reactor scram. The IC function was analyzed with a severe accident analysis code SAMPSON. The analysis results showed that (1) core melt resulting in RPV failure occurred since the IC operation was limited because it was not designed as a countermeasure to mitigate severe accident progression in Japan and (2) even assuming the continuous IC operation after the SBO to mitigate severe accident progression, the RPV failure occurred at 18:52, March 12th. However, since the alternate water injection by a fire engine was actually ready to start at 5:46, March 12th, which was earlier than calculated RPV failure time, the RPV failure could be prevented by continuous IC operation.

This content is only available via PDF.
You do not currently have access to this content.