Traditional risk models can be adapted to evaluate plant response for situations where plant systems and structures are intentionally damaged, such as from sabotage or terrorism. This paper describes a process by which traditional risk models can be spatially informed to analyze the effects of compound and widespread harsh environments through the use of “damage footprints.” A “damage footprint” is a spatial map of regions of the plant (zones) where equipment could be physically destroyed or disabled as a direct consequence of an intentional act. The use of “damage footprints” requires that the basic events from the traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) be spatially transformed so that the failure of individual components can be linked to the destruction of or damage to specific spatial zones within the plant. Given the nature of intentional acts, extensive modifications must be made to the risk models to account for the special nature of the “initiating events” associated with deliberate adversary actions. Intentional acts might produce harsh environments that in turn could subject components and structures to one or more insults, such as structural, fire, flood, and/or vibration and shock damage. Furthermore, the potential for widespread damage from some of these insults requires an approach that addresses the impacts of these potentially severe insults even when they occur in locations distant from the actual physical location of a component or structure modeled in the traditional PRA.
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14th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering
July 17–20, 2006
Miami, Florida, USA
Conference Sponsors:
- Nuclear Engineering Division
ISBN:
0-7918-4246-0
PROCEEDINGS PAPER
Spatially Informed Plant PRA Models for Security Assessment
Timothy A. Wheeler,
Timothy A. Wheeler
Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM
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Willard Thomas,
Willard Thomas
Omicron Safety and Risk Technologies, Inc., Albuquerque, NM
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Eric Thornsbury
Eric Thornsbury
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
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Timothy A. Wheeler
Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM
Willard Thomas
Omicron Safety and Risk Technologies, Inc., Albuquerque, NM
Eric Thornsbury
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
Paper No:
ICONE14-89598, pp. 319-325; 7 pages
Published Online:
September 17, 2008
Citation
Wheeler, TA, Thomas, W, & Thornsbury, E. "Spatially Informed Plant PRA Models for Security Assessment." Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering. Volume 5: Safety and Security; Low Level Waste Management, Decontamination and Decommissioning; Nuclear Industry Forum. Miami, Florida, USA. July 17–20, 2006. pp. 319-325. ASME. https://doi.org/10.1115/ICONE14-89598
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