External Cooling: The SWR 1000 Severe Accident Management Strategy

This paper provides the description of the basics behind design features for the severe accident management strategy of the SWR 1000. The hydrogen detonation/deflagration problem is avoided by containment inertization. In-vessel retention of molten core debris via water cooling of the external surface of the reactor vessel is the severe accident management concept of the SWR 1000 passive plant. During postulated bounding severe accidents, the accident management strategy is to flood the reactor cavity with Core Flooding Pool water and to submerge the reactor vessel, thus preventing vessel failure in the SWR 1000. Considerable safety margins have been determined by using state of the art experiment and analysis: regarding (a) strength of the vessel during the melt relocation and its interaction with water; (b) the heat flux at the external vessel wall; (c) the structural resistance of the hot structures during the long term period. Ex-vessel events are prevented by preserving the integrity of the vessel and its penetrations and by assuring positive external pressure at the predominant part of the external vessel in the region of the molten corium pool.