On March 18, 2001, a PWR nuclear power plant located in the Southern Taiwan occurred a Station BlackOut (SBO) event. Monsoon seawater mist caused the instability of offsite power grids. High salt-contained mist caused offsite power supply to the nuclear power plant very unstable, and forced the plant to be shutdown. Around 24 hours later, when both units in the plant were shutdown, several inadequate high cycles of bus transfer between 345 kV and 161 kV startup transformers degraded the emergency 4.16 kV switchgears. Then, in the Train-A switchgear room of Unit 1 occurred a fire explosion, when the degraded switchgear was hot shorted at the in-coming 345 kV breaker. Inadequate configuration arrangement of the offsite power supply to the emergency 4.16 kV switchgears led to loss of offsite power (LOOP) events to both units in the plant. Both emergency diesel generators (EDG) of Unit 1 could not be in service in time, but those of Unit 2 were running well. The SBO event of Unit 1 lasted for about two hours till the fifth EDG (DG-5) was lined-up to the Train-B switchgear. This study investigated the scenario of the SBO event and evaluated a risk profile for the SBO period. Guidelines in the SBO event, suggested by probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) procedures were also reviewed. Many related topics such as the re-configuration of offsite power supply, the addition of isolation breakers of the emergency 4.16 kV switchgears, the betterment of DG-5 lineup design, and enhancement of the reliability of offsite power supply to the PWR plant, etc., will be in further studies.

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