The foundation for new Emergency Operating Instructions (EOIs) being developed at several plants in the Ukraine is the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGs) developed in the U.S. The ERGs were chosen as a base for the new EOIs for several reasons. First the overall structure and format was adaptable to VVER Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) designs. Second, the ERGs have served as a base for many plant EOIs in both the U.S. and internationally. Third, key information supporting the ERGs was available. This paper describes the method used at one of the Ukrainian plants to provide an analytical justification for their EOIs. The method being employed by a second plant is very similar, differing only slightly in how it is implemented. The WOG ERG development program, which started shortly after the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, used many sources of technical information on plant and system transient response, which were available in support of the plant design and licensing efforts. In addition, operating experience from many operating PWR plants in the U.S. and around the world was used. For example, design basis accident (DBA) analyses, documented in a plant’s Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and other design documents, had been performed by Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) vendors, utilities, or the Architect/Engineer. All relevant sources were considered in the development of the ERGs. Limited Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) analyses were available during that time period. When a technical basis for a recovery strategy and associated operator actions was not available, an analysis was defined and performed. In general, these analyses were performed on a generic basis, and addressed the different categories of design (e.g., number of reactor coolant loops and/or low/high pressure safety injection system design). U.S. Nuclear Power plants that were in the WOG program were responsible for implementing the generic ERGs. This required the utilities to review the generic analyses to ensure that they were applicable and to justify any deviations from the ERG methodology. Modern PRA analyses are similar to the analyses supporting the ERGs since they address multiple failures and assume better estimate or expected assumptions for equipment availability and operator performance. The process being employed by Ukrainian plants is similar to the WOG. That is, available analyses and operating experience are being reviewed and pertinent information extracted to assist in the analytical justification of the EOIs. This includes the use of recently updated PRA and DBA analyses, other “original” design information and operating experience. A systematic review of the EOIs is being conducted to identify items requiring analytical justification. For each analysis identified, the specific purpose of the analysis is being documented. The analysis needs are then compared to the available analyses and operating experience. From this review, new analyses needed to justify the EOIs are developed, and a basis for using existing analyses is established. The work is being conducted in two phases. The first phase performs all of the reviews and assessments necessary to determine the new analyses required to justify the EOIs. In the second phase, these new analyses will be conducted and documented, and the EOI Analytical Justification (AJ) report will be written.
- Nuclear Engineering Division
Applying U.S. EOP Analytical Justification Experience for VVER Plants in the Ukraine
Linn, PA, Julian, HV, Chapman, JR, Trifanov, A, Zhabin, O, Fedorchenko, S, & Rybchuk, A. "Applying U.S. EOP Analytical Justification Experience for VVER Plants in the Ukraine." Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering. 10th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering, Volume 2. Arlington, Virginia, USA. April 14–18, 2002. pp. 415-422. ASME. https://doi.org/10.1115/ICONE10-22640
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