Within the EURATOM FP7 Collaborative Project “Fast / Instant Release of Safety Relevant Radionuclides from Spent Nuclear Fuel (CP FIRST-Nuclides)”, a State-of-the-Art Report was prepared. The fast / instant release fraction (IRF) is defined as a fraction of the inventory of radionuclides that may be rapidly released from the fuel and fuel assembly materials at the time of canister breaching. In the context of safety analysis for a repository, the time span for mobilization of this fraction can be considered instantaneously, even if the process takes some time in experiments. Radionuclides contributing to the fast release are fission gases (Kr and Xe), easily soluble elements such as cesium and iodine, and other elements which are hardly incorporated in the UO 2 crystal lattice. The present contribution summarizes the results obtained from published studies focused on rapid release experiments carried out with different spent nuclear fuel (SNF), samples, sizes, techniques (batch and flow-through), and durations. A total of 80 experiments cover the study of UO 2 SNF from pressure water reactors (PWR) of different initial enrichments and burn-up, while 20 experiments were performed with UO 2 SNF from boiling water reactors (BWR) and 8 with MOX fuel.

Disposal of low- and intermediate-level activated waste generated at nuclear power plants is being planned or carried out in many countries. The radioactivity concentrations and/or total quantities of long-lived, difficult-to-measure nuclides (DTM nuclides), such as C-14, Ni-63, Nb-94, α emitting nuclides etc., are often restricted by the safety case for a final repository as determined by each country’s safety regulations, and these concentrations or amounts are required to be known and declared. With respect to waste contaminated by contact with process water, the Scaling Factor method (SF method), which is empirically based on sampling and analysis data, has been applied as an important method for determining concentrations of DTM nuclides. This method was standardized by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and published in 2007 as ISO21238 “Scaling factor method to determine the radioactivity of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste packages generated at nuclear power plants” . However, for activated metal waste with comparatively high concentrations of radioactivity, such as may be found in reactor control rods and internal structures, direct sampling and radiochemical analysis methods to evaluate the DTM nuclides are limited by access to the material and potentially high personnel radiation exposure. In this case, theoretical calculation methods in combination with empirical methods based on remote radiation surveys need to be used to best advantage for determining the disposal inventory of DTM nuclides while minimizing exposure to radiation workers. Pursuant to this objective a standard for the theoretical evaluation of the radioactivity concentration of DTM nuclides in activated waste, is in process through ISO TC85/SC5 (ISO Technical Committee 85: Nuclear energy, nuclear technologies, and radiological protection; Subcommittee 5: Nuclear fuel cycle). The project team for this ISO standard was formed in 2011 and is composed of experts from 11 countries. The project team has been conducting technical discussions on theoretical methods for determining concentrations of radioactivity, and has developed the draft International Standard of ISO16966 “Theoretical activation calculation method to evaluate the radioactivity of activated waste generated at nuclear reactors” . This paper describes the international standardization process developed by the ISO project team, and outlines the following two theoretical activity evaluation methods: — Point method — Range method

In Belgium, the URL HADES was constructed in the Boom Clay formation at the Mol site to investigate the feasibility of geological disposal in a clay formation. Since 1995, the URL R&D programme has focused on large scale demonstration tests like the PRACLAY Heater and Seal tests. The main objective of the Heater Test is to demonstrate that the thermal load generated by the heat-emitting waste will not jeopardise the safety functions of the host rock. The primary objective of the Seal Test is to provide suitable hydraulic boundary conditions for the Heater Test. The Seal Test also provides an opportunity to investigate the in-situ behaviour of a bentonite-based EBS. The PRACLAY gallery was constructed in 2007 and the hydraulic seal was installed in 2010. The bentonite is hydrated both naturally and artificially. The swelling, total pressure and pore pressure of the bentonite are continuously measured and analysed by numerical simulations to get a better understanding of this hydration processes. The timing of switching on the heater depends on the progress of the bentonite hydration, as a sufficient seal swelling is needed to fulfill its role. A set of conditions to be met for the heater switch-on and its schedule will be given.

Hull and end-piece wastes generated from reprocessing plant operations are expected to be disposed of in a deep underground repository as Group 2 TRU wastes under the Japanese classification system. The activated metals that compose the spent fuel assemblies such as Zircaloy claddings and stainless steel nozzles are mixed and compressed after fuel dissolution, and then stuffed into stainless steel canisters. Carbon 14 is a typical activated product in the hulls and end-pieces and is mainly generated by the 14 N(n,p) 14 C reaction. In the previous safety assessment of the TRU waste in Japan, the radionuclides inventory was calculated by ORIGEN-2 code. Some conservative assumptions and preliminary estimates were used in this calculation. For example, total radionuclides generated from a single type of fuel assembly (45 GWd/tU for a PWR unit), and the thickness of the Zircaloy oxide film on the hulls (80 μm) were both overestimated. The second assumption in particular has a large effect on exposure dose evaluation. Therefore, it is essential to have a realistic source term evaluation regarding such items as the C-14 inventory and its distribution to waste parts. In the present study, a C-14 inventory of the hull and end-piece wastes from the operation of a commercial reprocessing plant in Japan corresponding to 32,000 tU (16,000 tU in each BWR and PWR) was calculated. Analysis using individual irradiation conditions and fuel characteristics was conducted on 6 types of fuel assemblies for BWRs and 12 types for PWRs (4 pile types × 3 burnup limits). The oxide film thickness data for each fuel type cladding were obtained from the published literature. Activation calculations were performed by using ORIGEN-2 code. For the amount of spent assembly and other waste characteristics, representative values were assumed based on the published literature. As a preliminary experiment, C-14 in irradiated BWR claddings was measured and found to be consistent with the calculated activation. The total C-14 inventory was estimated as 4.46×10 14 Bq, consisting of 2.58×10 14 Bq for BWRs and 1.87×10 14 Bq for PWRs, and is consistent with the safety assessment of 4.4×10 14 Bq. However, the distribution of the C-14 inventory to hull oxide, which was estimated under the assumption of instantaneous radionuclide release in the safety assessment, decreased from 5.72×10 13 Bq (13% of the total) in the previous assessment to 1.30×10 13 Bq (2.9% of the total; consisting of 1.48×10 12 for BWRs and 1.15×10 13 for PWRs). In other words, the exposure dose peak is reduced to approximate 25% of its previous value due to the use of detailed oxide film data that the BWR cladding has a thin oxide film. Other instantaneous release components for C-14 such as the fuel residual were negligible.

The aircraft impact accident has become very significant in the design of a nuclear facilities, particularly, after the tragic September 2001 event, that raised the public concern about the potential damaging effects that the impact of a large civilian airplane could bring in safety relevant structures. The aim of this study is therefore to preliminarily evaluate the global response and the structural effects induced by the impact of a military or commercial airplane (actually considered as a “beyond design basis” event) into a near surface radioactive waste (RWs) disposal facility. The safety evaluation was carried out according to the International safety and design guidelines and in agreement with the stress tests requirements for the security track. To achieve the purpose, a lay out and a scheme of a possible near surface repository, like for example those of the El Cabril one, were taken into account. In order to preliminarily perform a reliable analysis of such a large-scale structure and to determine the structural effects induced by such a types of impulsive loads, a realistic, but still operable, numerical model with suitable materials characteristics was implemented by means of FEM codes. In the carried out structural analyses, the RWs repository was considered a “robust” target, due to its thicker walls and main constitutive materials (steel and reinforced concrete). In addition to adequately represent the dynamic response of repository under crashing, relevant physical phenomena (i.e. penetration, spalling, etc.) were simulated and analysed. The preliminary assessment of the effects induced by the dynamic/impulsive loads allowed generally to verify the residual strength capability of the repository considered. The obtained preliminary results highlighted a remarkable potential to withstand the impact of military/large commercial aircrafts, even in presence of ongoing concrete progressive failure (some penetration and spalling of the concrete wall) of the impacted area.

The primary aim of the present work was to determine the inventories of the radionuclides and stable elements in vitrified high-level waste produced at La Hague and delivered to Germany, which are of importance for long-term safety assessment of final repositories for radioactive wastes. For a subset of these radionuclides and stable elements, the inventories were determined — either by direct measurements or by involving established correlations — and reported by AREVA. This allowed verification of the validity of application of a model approach utilizing the data of burnup and activation calculations and auxiliary information on the reprocessing and vitrification process operated at La Hague. Having proved that such a model approach can be applied for prediction of inventories of actinides, fission and activation products in vitrified waste, the present work estimated the minimum, average and maximum inventories of the radionuclides, which are of importance for long-term safety assessment of final repositories for radioactive waste but were not reported by AREVA for delivered CSD-V canisters. The average and maximum inventories in individual CSD-V canisters predicted in the present approach were compared to the inventories predicted by Nagra for canisters with vitrified waste delivered from La Hague to Switzerland [1]. This comparison revealed a number of differences between these inventories despite the fact that the canisters delivered to Switzerland were produced in essentially the same way and from the common reprocessing waste stock as CSD-V canisters delivered to Germany. Therefore, a further work is required in order to identify the reason for the discrepancy in the present estimation versus the Nagra estimation [1]. Such a work should also address the recommendation by the international peer review of the Safety Report of the Project Opalinus Clay to obtain estimates of the inventories of long-lived mobile radionuclides (such as 14 C, 36 Cl, 79 Se, and 129 I), which contribute most to the dose estimates in the radiological safety assessments, if possible, in agreement with other countries with similar waste streams in order for a coordinated set of data to be generated [2]. Since vitrified waste from reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel at La Hague was delivered to several countries — Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, and Switzerland — an international effort can be recommended.

The study of embedding matrix of radioactive waste is an important issue concerning the need to assure the radiological safety requirements for final disposal. The conditioning of the radioactive wastes by cementation process involves also a structural investigation by X-ray diffraction (XRD) of the samples prepared with cement and complexing agents at different concentration. This paper gives useful information about the influence of complexing agents related to damages produced in concrete microstructures. The experimental data obtained on samples kept in real repository environment for a period up to 15 years, offer structural information regarding the interaction between the different decontamination agents with the major components of the matrix.

Large scale demonstration experiments in underground research laboratories (both onsite and off-site) are currently undertaken by most high level radioactive waste management organisations. The decision to plan and implement prototype experiments, which might have a life of several decades, has both important strategic and budgetary consequences for the organisation. Careful definition of experimental objectives based on the design and safety requirements is critical. The implementation requires the involvement of many parties and needs flexible but consequent management as, for example, additional goals for the experiments, identified in the course of the implementation, might jeopardise initial primary goals. The outcomes of an international workshop in which European and Japanese implementers (SKB, Posiva, Andra, ONDRAF, NUMO and Nagra) but also certain research organisations (JAEA, RWMC) participated identified which experiments are likely to be needed depending on the progress in implementing a disposal programme. Already earlier in a programme, large scale demonstrations are generally performed aiming at reducing uncertainties identified during the safety case development such as thermo-hydraulic-mechanical process validation in the engineered barrier system and target host rock. Also feasibility testing of underground construction in a potential host rock at relevant depth might be required. Later in a programme, i.e., closer to the license application, large scale experiments aim largely at demonstrating engineering feasibility and performance confirmation of complete repository components. Ultimately, before licensing repository operation, 1:1 scale commissioning testing will be required. Factors contributing to the successful completion of large scale demonstration experiments in terms of planning, defining the objectives, optimising results and main lessons learned over the last 30 years are being discussed. The need for international coordination in defining the objectives of new large scale demonstration experiments is addressed. The paper is expected to provide guidance to implementing organisations (especially those in their early stages of the programme), considering participating in and/or or conducting on their own large scale experiments in the near future.

In the selection of sites for disposal facilities involving low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (LILW), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommendations require that “the region in which the site is located shall be such that significant tectonic and surface processes are not expected to occur with an intensity that would compromise the required isolation capability of the repository”. Evaluating the appropriateness of a site therefore requires a deep understanding of the geological and tectonic setting of the area. The Philippines sits in a tectonically active region frequented by earthquakes and volcanic activity. Its highly variable morphology coupled with its location along the typhoon corridor in the west Pacific region subjects the country to surface processes often manifested in the form of landslides. The Philippine LILW near surface repository project site is located on the north eastern sector of the Island of Luzon in northern Philippines. This island is surrounded by active subduction trenches; to the east by the East Luzon Trough and to the west by the Manila Trench. The island is also traversed by several branches of the Philippine Fault System. The Philippine LILW repository project is located more than 100 km away from any of these major active fault systems. In the near field, the project site is located less than 10 km from a minor fault (Dummon River Fault) and more than 40 km away from a volcanic edifice (Mt. Caguas). This paper presents an analysis of the potential hazards that these active tectonic features may pose to the project site. The assessment of such geologic hazards is imperative in the characterization of the site and a crucial input in the design and safety assessment of the repository.

Fennovoima is Finland’s third nuclear power company founded in 2007. Fennovoima will build a new nuclear power plant, Hanhikivi 1, in Pyhäjoki municipality located in Northern Finland. Currently Fennovoima is evaluating bids from reactor suppliers. Originally two suppliers, AREVA and Toshiba Heavy Industries were invited to bid for the plant but later also a bid from Rosatom were invited. The plant supplier will be selected in 2013. Platom is a Finnish company with extensive experience in radioactive waste management. In the beginning of 2008, Platom was assigned by Fennovoima as radioactive waste management consultant and to develop radioactive waste management strategy and to support Fennovoima in negotiations with plant suppliers in waste management aspects. Since Fennovoima has started, there have been some changes to the regulatory requirements which had to be taken into account while developing the strategy. One important change is due to the Government Degree 27.11.2008/736 which establishes a new waste category of very low-level waste following international development and the “new” IAEA waste classification. Other important change was introduced by the change 342/2008 to the Nuclear Energy Act allowing some nuclear waste to be delivered to another country for treatment. These and many more requirements had to be considered when developing the strategy. Early work by Platom was mostly done to support development of application for Decision-in-Principle. This was the first important licensing step for Fennovoima. Work started with studies and plans which were used by Fennovoima to gather the know-how required to draw up the application. Descriptions of waste streams and waste management technologies were developed as well as preliminary waste inventories and studies for final disposal, including preliminary dimensioning of the repository facilities. Based on these plans nuclear regulator’s preliminary safety assessment was performed. The work was successfully completed as in 2010 the Government of Finland granted Fennovoima a permit to build a new nuclear power plant. The work continued in 2012 when bids were received for EPR and ABWR type reactors. Plans developed earlier were elaborated into a detailed strategy and the proposed waste management solutions were evaluated. This allowed feedback from the bids into the strategy and to the bid specification and they both were developed. Also waste inventories were elaborated which allowed development of reactor design specific disposal strategies. The main objective of work has been to establish basis for safe and efficient radioactive waste management which meets all the relevant national and international recommendations, requirements and regulations, takes advantage of best available and state-of-art technologies and offers fit-for-purpose solutions. All the work was performed to accommodate requirement based management system.

ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, and its partners have developed long-term safety and performance analyses in the framework of the license application for a surface disposal facility for low level radioactive waste (category A waste) at Dessel, Belgium. This paper focusses on the methodology of the safety assessments and on key results from the application of this methodology. An overview is given (1) of the performance analyses for the containment safety function of the disposal system and (2) of the radiological impact analyses confirming that radiological impacts are below applicable reference values and constraints and leading to radiological criteria for the waste and the facility. In this discussion, multiple indicators for performance and safety are used to illustrate the multi-faceted nature of long-term performance and safety of the surface disposal. This contributes to the multiple lines of reasoning for confidence building that a positive decision to proceed to the next stage of construction is justified.

This study explores the development of a mechanical based system to retrieve single-shell tank waste at the Hanford site, located in Richland, Washington, without the addition of water. Out of 177 tanks at Hanford, there are 149 single-shell tanks (SST) and 28 double-shell tanks (DST). There are currently 67 SSTs that have leaked radioactive waste to the surrounding groundwater in the past or assumed to have questionable tank integrity. Leaking tanks continue to be a major concern as it was recently announced in February 2013 that six SSTs are leaking, even though they were believed to have been stabilized back in 2005. There are also several tanks with significant in-tank obstructions, such as air-lift circulators, where an arm-based retrieval would not be possible. All current methods of waste retrieval deployed involve the addition of significant amounts of water to generate a slurry that can be pumped out of the tank. This water, however, can exacerbate the leak and risk the potential of leaking more waste into the surrounding soil, subsequently contaminating the groundwater. It also reduces available waste storage space in DSTs, and increases the risk of dangerous buoyant displacement gas release events (BDGRE) in the headspace of DSTs. Focusing on leaking tanks, tanks with significant in-tank obstructions, and utilizing existing risers in Hanford’s tanks, this study evaluates commercially available dry technologies, such as augers and high-powered vacuums, for feasibility, safety, and efficiency of waste retrieval at Hanford.

The “Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Waste Management Act” (NMRWMA) in Taiwan has been in use since 2002. To promote further administrative efficiency and improve regulatory capacity, an amendment of the act has been initiated by the Atomic Energy Council (AEC). It is now being reviewed by outside experts and related communities so as to include the best understanding of risk management factors. For the future decommissioning challenges of nuclear facilities, the act is also being amended to comply with the regulatory requirements of the decommissioning mandates. Currently the Taiwan government is conducting government reorganization, and AEC will be reformed but will remain as an independent regulatory body. AEC will then be capable of improving the regulatory capacity for facilitating licensing and inspection, ensuring operational safety, environmental protection and public involvement, and giving a more flexible administrative discretion, such as expending the margin of penalty. The amendment is also required to provide a formal legal basis for the Nuclear Backend Fund, and to mandate the waste producers to take responsibility for any final debt repayment. In addition, this amendment promotes measures to prevent accidents or emergencies concerning radioactive materials and facilities and procedures to reduce the impact and effect of any unexpected events. Furthermore, this amendment intends to implement the concept of information transparency and public participation so as to meet the public needs. Finally, radioactive waste final disposal tasks have to be completed by waste producers under the supervision of the AEC.

The paper describes the design methodology that ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, has developed and applied in the framework of the surface disposal facility for category A waste, i.e. solid conditioned low level radioactive waste that contains a limited amount of long lived radionuclides, at Dessel. The proposed disposal facility supporting the submitted construction and operation license application [1, 2] is also presented.

The CAvern REtrievable (CARE) concept was originally developed to provide flexibility in tailoring disposal of vitrified HLW to small volunteer host sites, where high emplacement density leads to significant challenges in terms of the management of radiogenic heat. Including an extended storage period in underground caverns prior to sealing solved the heat issue, but also provided benefits in terms of a slow decision-making process that provided more opportunities to engage stakeholders. Recently, direct disposal of spent fuel is being considered in Japan and this gives more severe challenges for heat management, even for conventional disposal concepts. Due to great uncertainties in the future of nuclear power in Japan, this may also be associated with a desire to preserve the option of retrieval for extended periods. The basic CARE concept has thus been re-assessed to consider these aspects — and also the need to be able to develop a robust safety case that can be readily communicated to stakeholders, who are more sensitive to nuclear issues than they were in the past.

A final cap will be emplaced over the disposed waste as part of the closure engineering for the UK’s Low Level Waste Repository (LLWR). Additional profiling material will be required above the waste to obtain the required landform. Consideration has been given to the potential opportunity to reuse Low Specific Activity Material (LSAM, defined as up to 200 Bq g −1 ) imported from other sites as a component of the necessary profiling material for the final repository cap. Justification of such a strategy would ultimately require a demonstration that the solution is optimal with respect to other options for the long-term management of such materials. The proposal is currently at the initial evaluation stage and seeks to establish how LSAM reuse within the cap could be achieved within the framework of an optimised safety case for the LLWR, should such a management approach be pursued. The key considerations include the following: The LSAM must provide the same engineering function as the remainder of the profiling material. The cap design must ensure efficient leachate collection, drainage and control for Low Level Waste (LLW) (and, by extension, LSAM) during the Period of Authorisation. In the longer term the engineering design must passively direct any accumulating waters preferentially away from surface water systems. An initial design has been developed that would allow the placement of around 220,000m 3 of LSAM. The potential impact of the proposal has been assessed against the current Environmental Safety Case.

Radioactive waste systems and structures (RWSS) are safety-critical facilities in need of monitoring over prolonged periods of time. Structural health monitoring (SHM) is an emerging technology that aims at monitoring the state of a structure through the use of networks of permanently mounted sensors. SHM technologies have been developed primarily within the aerospace and civil engineering communities. This paper addresses the issue of transitioning the SHM concept to the monitoring of RWSS and evaluates the opportunities and challenges associated with this process. Guided wave SHM technologies utilizing structurally-mounted piezoelectric wafer active sensors (PWAS) have a wide range of applications based on both propagating-wave and standing-wave methodologies. Hence, opportunities exist for transitioning these SHM technologies into RWSS monitoring. However, there exist certain special operational conditions specific to RWSS such as: radiation field, caustic environments, marine environments, and chemical, mechanical and thermal stressors. In order to address the high discharge of used nuclear fuel (UNF) and the limited space in the storage pools the U.S. the Department of Energy (DOE) has adopted a “Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste” (January 2013). This strategy endorses the key principles that underpin the Blue Ribbon Commission’s on America’s Nuclear Future recommendations to develop a sustainable program for deploying an integrated system capable of transporting, storing, and disposing of UNF and high-level radioactive waste from civilian nuclear power generation, defense, national security, and other activities. This will require research to develop monitoring, diagnosis, and prognosis tools that can aid to establish a strong technical basis for extended storage and transportation of UNF. Monitoring of such structures is critical for assuring the safety and security of the nation’s spent nuclear fuel until a national policy for closure of the nuclear fuel cycle is defined and implemented. In addition, such tools can provide invaluable and timely information for verification of the predicted mechanical performance of RWSS (e.g. concrete or steel barriers) during off-normal occurrence and accident events such as the tsunami and earthquake event that affected Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The ability to verify the conditions, health, and degradation behavior of RWSS over time by applying nondestructive testing (NDT) as well as development of nondestructive evaluation (NDE) tools for new degradation processes will become challenging. The paper discusses some of the challenges associated to verification and diagnosis for RWSS and identifies SHM technologies which are more readily available for transitioning into RWSS applications. Fundamental research objectives that should be considered for the transition of SHM technologies (e.g., radiation hardened piezoelectric materials) for RWSS applications are discussed. The paper ends with summary, conclusions, and suggestions for further work.

On 31 Januray 2013, ONDRAF/NIRAS, the Belgian Agency for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Materials, has introduced the construction and operation license application for the surface disposal facility for category A waste at Dessel. The objective of this paper is to present the development of this national programme. First the key milestones and their impact on the development of the project will be highlighted. This includes in particular: 1) the turning point in 1994, when ONDRAF/NIRAS converts its purely techno-scientific work method into an approach of participation that allows for societal aspects to be taken into account and 2) the decision of the government in 2006 in favour of the surface disposal of category A waste in Dessel. Then the paper presents the pillars of the long-term safety of a surface disposal and the principles for site selection and how they were applied to the surface disposal facility for category A waste at Dessel. The pillars of the long-term safety of a surface disposal are: (1) the passive confinement and isolation provided by the Engineering Barrier System, (2) the contribution to this passive isolation and confinement by the site, (3) the limitation of the radioactive source term, and (4) the control and monitoring measures.

The UK Low Level Waste Repository has submitted a fully revised Environmental Safety Case (ESC) to the Environment Agency for the continued operation of the site. The Environment Agency is reviewing the submission. As part of the review of the ESC, we have been engaging with the Environment Agency to answer questions and provide further clarification where required. Once the review is complete, LLWR will apply for a revised permit for the continued operation of the site. We are required by our current Permit to operate the site in accordance with the assumptions of the ESC. We have developed a process for the implementation and maintenance of the ESC as a ‘live’ safety case under formal change control, and the development of waste acceptance arrangements identified as necessary to ensure that the repository is operated in a safe and optimised way, consistent with the assumptions and results of the ESC. Engagement with waste consignors has been essential in the development of revised waste acceptance criteria. Additional work has also been carried out in the development of an Article 37 submission, presenting the ESC to local stakeholders and developing of waste emplacement strategies.

As with the storage of all radioactive materials, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) must conform to safety requirements. Safety aspects like safe enclosure of radioactive materials, safe removal of decay heat, nuclear criticality safety and avoidance of unnecessary radiation exposure must be achieved throughout the storage period. The implementation of these safety requirements can be achieved by dry storage of SF and HLW in casks as well as in other systems such as dry vault storage systems or spent fuel pools, where the latter is neither a dry nor a passive system. After the events of Fukushima, the advantages of passively and inherently safe dry storage systems have become more obvious. TÜV and BAM, who work as independent experts for the competent authorities, present the licensing process for sites and casks and inform about spent nuclear fuel management and issues concerning dry storage of spent nuclear fuel, based on their long experience in these fields. All safety relevant issues like safe enclosure, shielding, removal of the decay heat or behavior of cask and building under accident conditions are checked and validated with state-of-the-art methods and computer codes before the license approval. It is shown how dry storage systems can ensure the compliance with the mentioned safety criteria over a long storage period. Exemplarily, the process of licensing, erection and operation of selected German dry storage facilities is presented.